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Abstract 
Purpose: Policy misalignment across different sectors of government serves 
as one of the pivotal barriers to WHO Framework convention on Tobacco 
Control (FCTC) implementation. This paper examines the logic used by 
government officials to justify providing investment incentives to increase 
tobacco processing and manufacturing in the context of FCTC implementation 
in Zambia. 
Methods: We conducted qualitative semi-structured interviews with key 
informants from government, civil society and intergovernmental economic 
organizations (n=23). We supplemented the interview data with an analysis 
of public documents pertaining to economic development policy in Zambia. 
Results: We found gross misalignments between the policies of the economic 
sector and efforts to implement the provisions of the FCTC. Our interviews 
uncovered the rationale used by officials in the economic sector to justify 
providing economic incentives to bolster tobacco processing and 
manufacturing in Zambia: 1) tobacco is not consumed by Zambians/tobacco 
is an export commodity, 2) economic benefits outweigh health costs, and 3) 
tobacco consumption is a personal choice. 
Conclusions: Much of the struggle Zambia has experienced implementing 
the FCTC can be attributed to misalignments between the economic and 
health sectors. Zambia’s development agenda seeks to bolster agricultural 
processing and manufacturing. Tobacco control proponents must understand 
and work within this context of economic development in order to foster 
productive strategies with those working on tobacco supply issues. These 
findings are broadly applicable to the global analysis on the barriers and 
facilitators of FCTC implementation. It is important that the Ministry of Health 
monitors the tobacco policy of other sectors and engages with these sectors 
to find ways of harmonizing FCTC implementation across sectors. 
 
Keywords: Economic Policy, Public Policy, Economic Development, 
Investment Incentives 
Introduction 
Tobacco control initiatives require coordinated interventions 
across all sectors of government. The WHO Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC) implementation requires coordination among 
government sectors dealing with health, agriculture, trade, industry 
and finance among others. This requirement is reflected in Article 5.1 
of the Treaty: “Each Party shall develop, implement, periodically 
update and review comprehensive multisectoral national tobacco 
control …”.1 One of the pressing challenges of FCTC implementation is 
the struggle to enlist the support of the non-health sectors of 
government who are either disengaged from the issue of tobacco 
control or actively pursue policies that are misaligned with the 
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provisions of the FCTC.2 Despite this need, whole-of-government 
approaches (WoG) to tobacco control have yet to find their place as 
the modus operandi of most governments.3,4 The challenge of WoG is 
particularly salient in the implementation of the FCTC. 
The FCTC is the first public health treaty to be negotiated and 
ratified under the auspices of the WHO and outlines measures to be 
implemented by parties to the Convention that serve to reduce the 
demand for and supply of tobacco.1 To date 180 countries are party to 
the Treaty (as of April 2015). Zambia ratified the FCTC in 2008. Since 
this time, the Ministry of Health, through the Tobacco Control Focal 
Point, has worked to implement policies and to establish legislation 
that aligns with the treaty’s commitments and provisions. Post-FCTC 
legislation was drafted in 2010 but as of April 2015 has not yet been 
adopted into law.5 The challenges of implementation are not unique to 
Zambia and our multi-country research is uncovering common barriers 
to implementation among tobacco-growing countries with emerging 
economies.6 One of these barriers relates to incentives to attract 
domestic and foreign direct investment (FDI). The general logic 
underlying government investment incentives is twofold.7 First, 
incentives are provided to stimulate economic growth or create value 
for the country by attracting capital, regardless of its origin, foreign or 
domestic.8 Second, incentives are a means of attracting investment to 
a country in a competitive global market place,9 intended to induce 
investment that otherwise would not be made. 
For Zambia, the pursuit of investment has become central to the 
political economy of the country’s future development. Despite 
consistent economic growth over the past decade, Zambia continues to 
struggle with high levels of poverty, income inequality and, in 2012, 
was ranked 163 of 187 countries on the Human Development Index.10 
Zambia’s economy relies heavily on mineral exports, notably copper. 
However, since 2002 Zambia has focused on diversifying its economy 
by supporting the agricultural and service sectors. According to a 
report by UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development) the “challenge (for Zambia) is to attract more 
investments in sectors other than mining”.11 The former president of 
Zambia, Michael Sata, noted “the aim of (his) government is to 
continue with policy and institutional reforms with the key objective of 
making the country more attractive to domestic and foreign private 
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investment”.12 FDI has increased significantly from $72 million (USD) 
in 2001 to $1.7 billion in 2012.13 Much of the FDI inflows are tied to 
the copper sector. The mining sector in general continues to be the 
largest attractor of FDI (approximately 70% of total investment 
pledges in 2008).11 Although agriculture only accounted for 22% of 
GDP in 2011 it is important for the livelihoods of the majority of 
Zambians, accounting for approximately 67% of employment and “has 
likewise been attracting FDI particularly in the areas of production of 
horticultural and floricultural products, as well as fruits, cotton, maize, 
tobacco and sugar”.11 It is this context of government-supported 
economic diversification and development that tobacco production, 
processing and manufacturing are being encouraged through 
investment incentives, representing a discrepancy between economic 
goals, and tobacco control commitments. This paper focuses on how 
these two dissonant goals are rationalized by different actors. 
Methods 
The findings presented in this paper are a result of a larger 
multi-country study in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia. This multi-country 
case study examines the political economy of tobacco control. The 
case study methodology is oriented towards using multiple methods to 
understand a complex phenomenon within a particular context.14,15 
The findings presented in this paper refer only to our research in 
Zambia. The findings are derived from data collected through semi-
structured interviews with representatives from the Department of 
Industry (n=3), Foreign Affairs (n=2), Foreign Trade (n=2), 
Agriculture and Agribusiness (n=5), World Health Organization country 
office (n=1), Ministry of Health (n=2), Tobacco Board of Zambia 
(n=1), Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) 
headquarters (n=1), health-based civil society organizations (n=3) 
and tobacco industry representatives (n=3). The key informants were 
identified using purposive sampling and were included because of their 
involvement in our area of interest, namely the political economy of 
tobacco and tobacco control. All interviews were conducted in the 
workplace of the informants by international and Zambian researchers 
associated with the study. All but two of the interviewees agreed to be 
recorded. Notes were taken during the interviews with these two 
participants. Interview length ranged between 10 and 60 minutes with 
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the majority of interviews at approximately 45 minutes. We 
supplemented the interview data with public documents on Zambia’s 
economic development plans and tobacco investment. Key informants 
pointed our research team to the key strategic documents from the 
Zambian Development Agency that informed their work. In addition to 
documents identified by key informants we collected other public 
documents pertaining to Zambia’s development agenda, such as 
reports produced by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. The study protocol received ethics approval by the 
Institutional Review Boards of McGill University, Morehouse University 
(American Cancer Society) and the University of Zambia. All interviews 
were transcribed verbatim and analyzed using thematic analysis.16 The 
transcripts were entered into NVivo qualitative software for data 
management. The qualitative analysis was conducted by the lead 
author and used both deductive coding (based on the interview 
questions) as well as inductive coding. The results were discussed with 
team members, two of whom were experienced Zambian researchers 
active in the health and tobacco area, for verification. 
Results 
One of the major initiatives of the Zambian government to 
attract investment was the creation of the Zambia Development 
Agency (ZDA) in 2006, with the mandate to “foster economic growth 
and development by promoting trade and investment in Zambia 
through an efficient, effective and coordinated private sector led 
economic development strategy”.17 Tobacco export promotion is one of 
the country’s priorities, now absorbed within the work of the ZDA, 
justified primarily by its importance to farmers:  
…It is a key industry especially for the farmers … We have more 
than twenty thousand small scale farmers growing tobacco at 
the moment meaning that each farmer is able to take care of 
about six members of the family and when we do the math we 
will actually see how important this sector is in this country and 
how critical this industry is in reducing poverty levels. (ZDA 
informant) 
Tobacco production receives incentives in terms of machinery 
and agrichemical imports, on which “duty and VAT are not paid.” The 
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key informant from ZDA was not aware of the FCTC, and 
acknowledged that ZDA does get involved in trade and tobacco 
disputes in “bilateral and multilateral discussions … in 
Geneva…articulating our interests.” 
The ZDA is also responsible for the governance of Multi-Facility 
Economic Zones (MFEZ) and Industrial Parks that were established in 
2005 with investors from Japan and China. The MFEZs (special 
industrial zones to both export-oriented and domestic-oriented 
industries) were established to “create a platform for Zambia to 
achieve economic development by attracting significant domestic and 
foreign direct investment (FDI) through a strengthened policy and 
legislative environment,” and are characterized by “the best features 
of free trade zones (FTZs), export processing zones (EPZs) and the 
industrial parks/zones concept”.18 In addition to bolstering governance 
and infrastructure to create an attractive investment environment, the 
ZDA provides a list of investment incentives offered to investors who 
intend to establish operations in the MFEZs or whose investment aligns 
with Zambia’s development priority sectors. There are seven MFEZ 
priority sectors and twelve general priority sectors including agro-
processing and manufacturing of agricultural products, including 
tobacco. The principal requirement to receive an investment incentive 
from the ZDA is outlined in article 56: “An investor investing not less 
than five hundred thousand United States Dollars or the equivalent in 
convertible currency, in a priority sector or product, is entitled to 
incentives as specified by or under the Income Tax Act or Customs and 
Excise Act”.17 The priority given to agro-processing and manufacturing 
is supported by the objective to establish value addition within 
Zambia.19 including efforts “to increase tobacco processing for more 
value-added”.11 
This objective of value-addition is currently being enacted 
through government support for the establishment of a tobacco 
processing and manufacturing plant in the Makeni Industrial Park (an 
MFEZ) in Lusaka by Roland Imperial Tobacco Company (RITCO), a 
Zambian company.20–22 At present the plant is intended simply to 
process tobacco leaf. But, a senior staff person with the MFEZ noted, 
“in the long run [the company has] indicated it is in phases, in phase 
one they are processing and laying the ground work, and then when 
they get to phase three, that is when they begin to manufacturing the 
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finished product [cigarettes].” In a public pronouncement, the CEO of 
RITCO claimed “we invested more than USD $8 million in our new 
cigarette plant in Lusaka, which can produce two billion cigarettes per 
year, or around twice the cigarettes sold in Zambia annually”.22 This 
amount far exceeds the USD $500,000 minimum investment that is 
required to qualify for the incentives outlined by the ZDA.17,19,23 
Whether restricted to leaf processing only, or proceeding to 
finished product (not all Zambian informants thought this would be 
likely), the company would benefit from government support in the 
form of no tariffs or VAT on imported machinery or raw goods. As well, 
“the government is funding this [MFEZ] … they had to put up a 
requisite structure [electricity, roads, water] to make sure that the 
place is conducive for our investors both local and foreign” (MFEZ 
informant). It would also be exempt from any tax on profits for the 
first 5 years, paying only fifty percent of the standard corporate rate 
for the next three and seventy-five percent for the following two years. 
Only after 10 years would profits be taxed at Zambia’s normal 
corporate rate. These benefits would apply to tobacco, as to any other 
agro-industry product that comprise one of ZDA’s priority investment 
areas, and to processed leaf or finished products regardless of whether 
they are meant for the domestic or export market. That these 
incentives could give an unfair advantage over other Zambian tobacco 
leaf processors or a manufacturer (one of our informants stated that 
another manufacturing plant was getting established outside of an 
MFEZ) “has not yet been discussed, because the primary objective of 
these zones is to promote investment” (MFEZ informant).  
“We are working knowing we have been told [by ZDA] to win 
investors…we are being pushed that we need investors [yet] I 
know that it has been the objective of the government to 
regulate [tobacco] consumption…so you may say that if they are 
doing that then are contradicting that…We market [investment] 
on the marketing point of view not on the health point of 
view…If we say we look at the health point then we would be 
negative for us [and] we have to show the positive side” (MFEZ 
informant). 
Our interviews with representatives from Zambia’s Department’s 
of Industry (DoI) and Foreign Trade (DoFT) similarly found that these 
departments were also actively encouraging tobacco companies to set 
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up processing and manufacturing facilities in Zambia. The participants 
explicitly stated that they encouraged the provision of investment 
incentives to make this happen, for both the domestic and 
international market Both department representatives viewed tobacco 
manufacturing as a potential growth area for Zambia’s economic 
development objectives. This encouragement was situated in the 
development strategy targeting value addition (namely manufacturing 
of agricultural products grown in Zambia) within the economy: “the 
agricultural sector will continue to be a strategic area of focus in 
promoting economic growth, reducing poverty and creating 
employment”.24 Since the closing of the British American Tobacco 
manufacturing plant in Lusaka in 2006,25 all of the cured tobacco was 
being exported for manufacturing in other countries. 
When asked about the role of the FCTC in the policies of their 
respective departments (i.e. DoI and DoFT), the participants only had 
a vague understanding of its provisions or what commitments Zambia 
had made to implementation. A high-level key informant from the 
DoFT was unsure whether the treaty was in force in Zambia and noted 
“implementation hasn’t started yet”. This statement may have been in 
reference to stalled comprehensive tobacco control legislation, 
although the treaty had come into force in Zambia in August 2008. It 
is difficult to identify whether there is a true lack of understanding of 
the FCTC and its relation to the economic policies of the country by 
these informants, or whether their government departments are 
intentionally acting contrary to its provisions. Our sense from the 
interviews was that the FCTC was simply not considered to be relevant 
to the work of either the DoI or the DoFT, and was situated as a 
singular Department of Health initiative. When we asked the 
participants about the relationship between investment incentives for 
tobacco processing and manufacturing and the health aspects of 
tobacco consumption, one participant stated that: “It is our view that 
the benefits to the economy will outweigh the health costs” (DoI 
informant). 
Another participant, making the same argument as the 
interviewee from the MFEZ, noted “our concern is to promote industrial 
development and because smoking was a personal decision we are not 
concerned with the health aspects” (DoI). 
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The view that Zambia’s tobacco production, and even its 
potential future cigarette manufacturing, would not add to its domestic 
smoking rates was echoed by tobacco industry informants, one of 
whom was quite explicit:  
“There is this myth that the more tobacco we grow here the 
more smokers we will have. We do not grow tobacco for local 
consumption but rather for the growing market like China. There 
is no correlation with the level of growing tobacco in Zambia to 
the level of smoking. It doesn’t exist. In fact there is a reduction 
in smoking in Zambia (tobacco industry informant).” 
The most recent WHO tobacco report on Zambia, however, 
estimates that in 2012 24% of males were current cigarette smokers, 
22% of them daily, an increase of 2 and 5 percentiles respectively 
over the previous year.26 Female rates remain considerably lower, but 
are rising amongst adolescents.27 When asked that, even assuming 
Zambian tobacco was strictly for export, it still meant someone else 
will be consuming a hazardous product, the response was swift, “even 
if we do not grow tobacco in Zambia, somebody else will grow it [and 
export it] so you see what I mean, it will still be there.” The Tobacco 
Association of Zambia (TAZ), representing farmers, noted that “the 
harmful effects on the human being is not debatable, it has been 
proven, we have all seen it” but that “it all borders on educating the 
person, that you have a choice in life and should manage your life 
accordingly” (TAZ informant). 
These qualitative findings provide important insights into the 
rationale used by members of the government’s economic sector when 
developing policy pertaining to tobacco, which often resembles the 
arguments of Zambia’s tobacco industry and farming representatives; 
and suggests that there is deep misalignment between FCTC 
commitments and efforts to implement the treaty across relevant 
sectors of government. The tension this creates was best captured in 
the somewhat wistful comment made by our MFEZ informant near the 
end of the interview: “I think somehow there must be harmonization 
of government policy; then that will make it much easier for 
stakeholders.” 
One of the salient conditions underlying policy misalignment and 
lack of harmonization is that tobacco control is under-resourced. There 
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will need to be great effort to strengthen the system of 
implementation within countries like Zambia. One individual serves as 
the FCTC focal point but is responsible for a diverse portfolio of 
responsibilities beyond tobacco control. Along with other African 
countries at the FCTC Conference of Parties meetings, Zambia has 
complained about the lack of resources to implement tobacco control. 
A senior policy worker in the Ministry of Health thought that one 
reason why the comprehensive tobacco control legislation has been 
stuck for four years is that “We had the challenge of funding, because 
initially tobacco was not on our agenda and … we [had] different 
budget lines…[and] it gives us a gap because we don’t have funds to 
use for that purpose”. There is no multisectoral body in Zambia 
charged with FCTC implementation and the different sectors “are not 
coordinating properly” (Ministry of Health informant). Departments of 
Industry, Foreign Trade and Agriculture noted that they did not work 
with the Ministry of Health around issues of tobacco and tobacco 
control. There is, however, an active, but small, group of civil society 
organizations and individuals within government working in tobacco 
control, but it must contend with a politically active and highly-
resourced tobacco industry whose own interests in ‘coordinating’ is 
about:  
“…sitting together. You see look we agree on most of the things 
but because we do not sit together we assume that we don’t 
agree. We need to sit together as an industry…The problem in 
this country is that we do not have an apex, one organization 
where all players meet for cross cutting issues” (tobacco 
industry informant). 
Discussion 
Our findings on the Zambia’s tobacco investment incentives 
point to an urgent need for proponents of the FCTC (domestic and 
international) to engage with the ZDA, DoI and DoFT to generate 
economic policies that align with FCTC commitments. The question is 
how to do this? 
The Zambian government, like many governments around the 
world, is fragmented when it comes to governing tobacco and tobacco 
control. This fragmentation exists not only internally but also at 
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different levels whereby the DoI, DoFT and ZDA are linked with 
different economic development agencies within the United Nations 
system and the Department of Health is operating with relationships to 
the WHO and the Framework Convention Secretariat. Fragmentation is 
a not a new phenomenon and undergirds calls made within the United 
Nations System to “strengthen multisectoral and inter-agency 
responses for the full implementation of the WHO FCTC”.28 To label the 
lack of communication, coordination and cooperation between sectors 
as fragmentation is only theoretically valid if there is underlying need 
to act collectively. In the case of FCTC implementation, fragmentation 
exists because comprehensive tobacco control implementation 
(invoking all components of the treaty including supply and demand 
measures) requires interventions in different sectors and levels of 
government. In this sense, FCTC implementation poses a collective 
action problem that challenges institutional designs that create 
departmental silos with minimal interaction and strong jurisdictional 
boundaries between sectors. In fact, the integrity of traditional 
departmental jurisdiction is reflected in the authority to “operate 
within a spatial and functional realm”.29 A logical starting point to 
facilitate intersectoral working is to establish a forum for dialogue. The 
forum itself is not a panacea but rather an initial point of contact. 
Brazil presents a good example of how a high-level decision from the 
President created a forum (CONICQ – i.e. the intersectoral 
coordinating mechanism for the implementation of the FCTC) that 
brought together 13 different ministries and departments to work on 
FCTC implementation.30,31 It will likely require a high-level decision to 
create such a forum in Zambia. Another basic starting point for those 
working on FCTC implementation in countries like Zambia is to begin 
to establish and propagate norms embedded in the FCTC. In this case 
it will be the responsibility of proponents of tobacco control to 
reinforce the binding legal nature of commitments made to the FCTC 
to other sectors of government. The guidelines for Article 5.3 explicitly 
state, “Parties should not grant incentives, privileges or benefits to the 
tobacco industry to establish or run their business” (Article 5.3 
guidelines, p. 8), which evidence from this research suggests they are 
presently violating in Zambia. 
It is possible that the first reaction to our findings might be that 
the tobacco industry has coopted FCTC implementation by “capturing” 
the economic sector. Regulatory capture, “specifically the process 
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through which regulated (companies) end up manipulating state 
agencies that are supposed to control them”,32 is a common 
occurrence in tobacco politics.33–35 We suggest that although this may 
be, and likely is, part of the scenario in Zambia, there are other 
contextual factors that create a pull towards providing investment 
incentives for tobacco manufacturing. Zambia is a tobacco producer 
and exporter. The priority for the country is to diversify its economic 
outputs while supporting value-addition in its processing and 
manufacturing within the country. In this context tobacco is a logical 
target for value-addition (leaf processing and manufacturing) given 
that the supply-chain is well established. This is not to say that the 
provision of investment incentives is good practice; in fact, we suggest 
the opposite. Understanding this context will allow tobacco control 
proponents to target the underlying logic used by government officials 
who are promoting tobacco production, while also developing an 
empathetic stance when working to develop collaborative relationships 
with other government sectors. Understanding this context provides 
the basis for remedying this policy misalignment from the perspective 
of FCTC implementation. There are numerous interventions that can 
address this misalignment between economic policy pertaining to 
tobacco and commitments to implement the provisions of the FCTC. 
The arguments used by our key informants in favor of bolstering 
tobacco manufacturing through government investment incentives 
suggests that discourse in the economic sector is largely influenced by 
the standard arguments (e.g. job loss/gain, revenue generation, 
personal choice) perpetuated by the tobacco industry over the years, 
particularly in tobacco growing countries.36,37 Studies like this one 
provide important information to sensitize tobacco control proponents 
to the perspectives and approaches being fostered outside of the 
health sector. This sensitization is particularly important as countries 
begin to implement intersectoral coordinating mechanisms for FCTC 
implementation as per Article 5.2. It is recognized that the political 
economic context must be confronted and engaged with by tobacco 
control proponents for any lasting success in tobacco control policy to 
be made.2,38–40 
At a more abstract level, this study suggests a need to establish 
and integrate norms pertaining to the economics of tobacco and 
tobacco control. Our interviews revealed that the logic employed within 
the economic sector, that tobacco is a viable and sustainable economic 
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commodity, still persists despite numerous studies to the contrary.41–43 
The argument that tobacco is an export commodity and therefore not 
linked to the health of the population within the country is contrary to 
the intent of the FCTC to reduce tobacco consumption worldwide (and 
not simply in any given country). Without comprehensive tobacco 
control measures in place it is predicted that consumption among 
Zambians will increase.27,44–47 It is reported that RITCO is in discussion 
with Japan Tobacco Incorporated (JTI) to produce JTI brands for the 
Zambian market.22 RITCO itself has indicated that they will be 
developing new brands to be sold in the domestic market. The 
proliferation of tobacco products without the protection of 
comprehensive tobacco control measures will likely lead to dramatic 
increases in consumption. 
Government investment incentives that support tobacco 
industry development are deeply problematic for FCTC 
implementation. This finding in Zambia’s case, which we speculate is 
likely repeated in most other low-income tobacco-producing countries 
that are also Parties to the FCTC, points to an urgent need to foster 
whole-of-government FCTC implementation. 
  
What This Paper Adds 
 Successful implementation of the WHO Framework Convention 
on Tobacco Control (FCTC) will require whole-of-government 
(WoG) engagement. 
 There continues to exist gross misalignments between the 
economic policies of tobacco producing countries like Zambia, 
who are providing investment incentives to support tobacco 
industry activity, and commitments made to implement the 
provisions of the FCTC. 
 Providing investment incentives to stimulate tobacco processing 
and manufacturing is contrary to Article 5.3 of the FCTC and is a 
crucial component to be addressed by tobacco control 
proponents to reduce the supply of tobacco. 
 Our study provides important insights into the underlying logic 
used by officials to justify investment incentives that support 
tobacco processing and manufacturing. 
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